Right thing, wrong time and place

Erickson fired because he dumped the WCO

January 7, 2005 (NHS) -- Dennis Erickson got the boot after a 2-14 season, and no surprise, the press is having a field day bidding the boring coach good riddance, blaming evil Dr. York for all that is wrong in the universe, pining away for the alleged Best Ever Dynasty Days, etc. -- you know, the same old ridiculous sky-is-falling reaction we get any time anything happens in Whinerland.

But note the one thing you won't be reading anywhere but here: the role of the West Coast offense ("WCO") in getting Erickson canned. More specifically, it was Erickson's decision to abandon the WCO and move the 49ers in a more legitimate offensive direction that ultimately was his undoing. Here's why:

Turnovers, more than any other statistic, have a direct correlation to winning and losing. According to a study from 1990 through 2000 done by the Elias Sports Bureau, teams that were minus-3 in giveaway/takeaways lost 89 percent of their games and teams that were minus-2 lost 83 percent of the time. Note that this stat includes every team, good or bad, no matter how talented.
The 49ers had a -19 turnover differential on the year, second to last in the NFL. This is an amazing about-face from last season: in 2003, the 49ers led the NFC with a +11 differential. They gave away a whopping 40 turnovers this season, up from 25 the year before and 17 in 2002.
Now, this may be way too sophisticated for our lovable sports media, but a huge reason the 49ers went from only 17 giveaways in 2002 to leading the NFC in giveaways today is because in 2002 they ran Steve Mariucci's version of the WCO. Then Erickson starting trying to "go downfield" more in 2003, and ultimately decided to shift away from the WCO altogether this season.

Before we follow this logic further, certainly we understand luck and talent have a lot to do with turnovers. But so does offensive philosophy. Nobody is surprised when the Rams, even with all their talent, lead the NFL in giveaways because that's part of their game. They go for the jugular in their risky vertical passing game, and when you live by the sword, you can die by the sword.

The WCO is hardly a sword; it's more like a pillow. As we've explained (and the media's tried to hide) too often to count, almost the entire reason the 49er dink 'n dunk game was so successful is due to how it reduces turnover risk. We call it a gutless way to play football, but for years the Bandwagon has hailed it as "smart football" or "enlightened".

Thus, when Erickson was hired two years ago, we couldn't believe that the Niner Bandwagon -- including Bill Walsh himself -- was actually celebrating the thought that Erickson was going to "go downfield" more and give up the very advantage primarily responsible for their past success. We addressed this myth that Erickson's added element of the deep pass will improve the 49ers' offense and warned "the WCO and 'downfield' are mutually exclusive, by definition. Apples and oranges ... Deep passes destroy the very things that make the WCO succeed."

But the staggering Niner arrogance allowed them to think you could magically change twenty years of cheesy 49er football, from its short-pass gimmick into a legit offense, overnight. "Hey, just mix in a deep pass every now and then!" was the refrain. None of the Bandwagon could understand that was like mixing a little nitro into glycerin.

Today, the Bandwagon should understand: trying to run a real offense is a bitch, ain't it?

That's because you need real talent to make other systems work. But alas, the Bandwagon simply cannot grasp the difference between being "system-based" and "talent-based". For years the 49ers' passing system has been designed around dinks to such a huge extent that the goal was you could plug in the janitor and he would have a 90 passer rating. That's why when Steve Young was injured, his backups had a better win-loss record. That's why he and Joe Montana remain the most overrated QBs in NFL history, because historians do not take into account the system factor when looking at their glorious passer ratings.

Erickson's predecessor, Steve Mariucci, understood this. Thus, even though the 49ers' lacked elite talent and Mooch was 12-30 against teams .500 or better, they had gaudy win-loss records overall because the 49ers could still beat the weak sisters on their easy schedules thanks to their system of dink passes. The bad teams would simply give up more turnovers and lose.

Changing this approach to winning -- or more accurately, not losing -- was the most significant danger in the hiring of Dennis Erickson. While the Bandwagon frothed over "going downfield", the NHS warned, "Odds are that any changes will do nothing but disrupt the 49ers' cozy niche. If they venture outside their realm of beating fluff and concentrate on trying to be legit, they will find out their talent won't stand up when tested, and their wins will drop."

Erickson, in dumping the WCO at the start of this season, fulfilled that prophecy. He asked Tim Rattay and Ken Dorsey -- both inexperienced QBs -- to drop back and win ballgames with good throws. Their talent couldn't stand up. The pressure built. Rattay became a human turnover machine. Risky throws mean more INTs. Longer passes mean longer drop-backs into the pocket, more pressure due to a terrible offensive line, more sacks, and more fumbles. And it all comes back to Erickson asking Rattay or Dorsey and their offensive line to make a play based on talent, as opposed to the past luxury of having the WCO system make the plays.

Meanwhile, the Bandwagon will continue to miss this point and blame everything on the purge of talent. Yes, overrated players like Terrell Owens, Jeff Garcia, and others left, but remember -- even if all those guys came back, this was a team that went 7-9 the previous year despite a +11 turnover advantage!

If these 2004 49ers had a +11 turnover advantage as opposed to their -19 (a difference of almost +2 turnovers per game), even considering their awful talent, they still would have had a few extra meaningless wins. A 4-12 or 5-11 finish may have been enough to save Erickson's job. Instead, Erickson shafted the WCO back in June, and the NHS previewed that the 2004 season would be about "watching a no-talent Niners team wallow in their stink absent the deodorant of the WCO."

For Niner-haters, it was a joy to watch the 49ers finally suffer turnovers like all other teams have suffered in the past, and a huge vindication that much of their past success was built on their cowardly approach to football in avoiding risk in the WCO. When they tried to play like men, they failed. In fact, they were the worst team in football, and it's no coincidence it happened without the WCO.

Return home.

We welcome comments.